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Abstract
In this paper, we argue that posing new researchable questions in educational research
is a dynamic process that reflects the field’s growing understanding of the web of
potentially influential factors surrounding the examination of a particular phenomenon
of interest. We illustrate this thesis by drawing on a strand of mathematics education
research related to students’ justification schemes that has evolved rapidly during the
past few decades. Also, we reflect on the possible boundaries of the domain of
application of the thesis, and we hypothesize that it would apply equally to other
strands of educational research. To support this hypothesis, we briefly consider how the
thesis would be applicable in two additional research strands. We conclude by elabo-
rating on three important implications of the thesis: (1) as new potentially influential
factors about the phenomenon of interest are identified, findings from past research that
had not accounted for those factors might prove to be insufficient or be put into
question; (2) there are increased methodological challenges for researchers as they
seek to design new studies that pay due regard to research advances about all relevant
and potentially influential factors surrounding the phenomenon of interest; and (3) as a
wider range of potentially influential factors get discovered and considered about a
particular phenomenon, research knowledge becomes not only more refined, and
presumably more accurate, but possibly more fragmented too.
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Introduction
In every empirical study in educational research, the researcher needs to make
decisions on how to deal with factors that can possibly influence the phenomenon
under examination. In particular, when posing a new research question, the
researcher needs to make decisions about whether (a) to ignore certain factors
that are deemed unimportant, (b) to document other factors heavily or using a
“light touch” approach depending on their expected or presumed influence on the
phenomenon under examination, or (c) to modify the research design so as to
make non-applicable certain potentially influential factors that are nevertheless of
no special interest to the new research. In posing a researchable question (i.e. a
question that can be investigated empirically), decisions about how to deal with
the whole web of factors that can possibly influence the phenomenon under
examination need to be made carefully, transparently, and in a justifiable way,
drawing on relevant theoretical or conceptual frameworks and associated empirical
findings. If proper handling of potentially influential factors is not possible, then
the question can be deemed non-researchable and an alternative research question
may have to be posed.
The process we described above, which we consider typical of empirical
research in education that involves qualitative or quantitative methods alike, is
grounded in an important assumption: in posing a new researchable question, the
researcher has sufficient understanding of the web of potentially influential factors
and the possible influence that each of them might have on the phenomenon under
examination so as to make informed decisions about how to handle these factors
(see options a–c in the previous paragraph). This assumption, though sensible and
to some extent inevitable for any empirical research study to be carried out, is
often left implicit in research reports. Yet, we argue, the assumption deserves
careful reflection and scrutiny in empirical research reports—both in the descrip-
tion of the research design and in the interpretation of the research findings about
the phenomenon under examination.
The importance of doing so derives primarily from the fact that a researcher’s
understanding of the web of potentially influential factors for a specific research
question is inevitably limited, as that understanding can only reflect the current state
of research knowledge in the field about the respective topic. In other words, the
researcher cannot exclude the possibility of the presence of influential factors other than
those already considered or known in the literature at the time. If, however, other
important factors did exist, these factors would not have been accounted for in the
research design but they might have nevertheless influenced the research findings.
Also, when knowledge of these other important factors becomes available, this knowl-
edge will have to be considered by subsequent studies on the topic and, of course, it
will have to be reflected in the phrasing of these studies’ research questions, which in
essence will be new researchable questions.
In this paper, we set forth the thesis that posing new researchable questions in
educational research is a dynamic process that reflects the field’s growing understand-
ing of the web of potentially influential factors surrounding the examination of a
particular phenomenon. Several important implications follow from this thesis, which
we will consider later in the paper.
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The Scope of the Paper
Our primary aim in this paper is to exemplify the aforementioned thesis and
associated implications. We do so mainly by discussing in depth one example
that derives from a major strand of mathematics education research in the area of
proof. The example traces the development of researchable questions concerning
researchers’ efforts to investigate students’ justification schemes (Harel & Sowder,
1998, 2007) based on students’ performance on proof construction tasks (defini-
tions of the terms in italics will be offered later in the paper). The area of students’
justification schemes has attracted the investigation of a wealth of research
questions that meet the criteria set forth by Cai, Morris, Hohensee, Hwang,
Robison, Cirillo, Kramer and Hiebert (2019) that characterize significant research
questions. Specifically, students’ justification schemes have been connected in the
literature with instructional problems that many teachers across levels of education
share (see, e.g. Harel & Sowder, 2007); also researchers have strived “to under-
stand underlying mechanisms [of these problems] and their interactions with the
context” (Cai et al., 2019, p. 118).
In our discussion, we will draw partly on our own research in the area of
students’ justification schemes and partly on research that was conducted by
others in order to illustrate the point that new researchable questions have
evolved dynamically with the field’s growing understanding of the web of
factors that influence both students’ performance on proof construction tasks
and the inferences that researchers draw, or can draw, about students’ justifica-
tion schemes based on that performance. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
trace the full development of new researchable questions in this area. One
reason for this is our desire to illustrate a thesis rather than provide a compre-
hensive review of a particular strand of research. Another reason is our
inevitably incomplete understanding of the relevant literature, which has ex-
panded rapidly over the past few decades (for relevant partial reviews, see
Harel & Sowder, 2007; Stylianides, Bieda, & Morselli, 2016; Stylianides,
Stylianides, & Weber, 2017). As we will explain later in the paper, the rapid
growth of research knowledge in this area has enhanced in rather complex ways
the field’s understanding of students’ justification schemes, while at the same
time it has created increased methodological challenges for researchers as they
seek to achieve a defensible balance between investigating new researchable
questions about students’ justification schemes and being considerate of the
wealth of factors that have been found to bear on students’ proof constructions.
Obviously, we would not write this paper if we thought that its thesis was specific to
a particular strand of research within mathematics education. Towards the end of the
paper, we will briefly discuss two other strands of mathematics education research to
which we argue the same thesis would apply so as to give readers a sense of the
possible broader applicability of the thesis. Our limited knowledge of the evolution of
researchable questions in other research strands within mathematics education and
beyond does not allow us to explore the boundaries of the domain of application of
the thesis. We hypothesize, though, that the same ideas would apply more broadly,
including in other strands of educational research such as science education, and we
invite other researchers to contribute to the exploration of this hypothesis.
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Investigating Students’ Justification Schemes Using Proof
Construction Tasks
We will begin this section by providing some background context for research on the
notion of students’ justification schemes. We will then exemplify our thesis by
discussing new researchable questions that emerged over time as researchers used
proof construction tasks to investigate students’ justification schemes. We will conduct
this exemplification in two parts: first, by discussing in detail the transition from one
researchable question to a new one, drawing on relevant research from the 1990s and
the 2000s; second, by discussing the expansion of new researchable questions, drawing
on the findings of three recent research studies in the area.
Research Context
Harel and Sowder (1998, 2007) used the notion of “justification schemes” (also
referred to as “proof schemes” in some of their publications) to describe what argu-
ments convince students and what arguments students offer to convince others, that is,
what counts as a proof from the students’ standpoint. Specifically, Harel and Sowder
(2007) defined an individual’s justification scheme with respect to “what constitutes
ascertaining and persuading for that person” (p. 809), where ascertaining is defined to
be “the process an individual […] employs to remove her or his […] own doubts about
the truth of an assertion” (p. 808) and persuading is “the process an individual […]
employs to remove others’ doubts about the truth of an assertion” (p. 808).
Unsurprisingly, students’ standards of conviction often do not align with acceptable
standards of conviction in the mathematical community, and this constitutes an instruc-
tional problem that many mathematics teachers (including university instructors) face
as they engage their students in proving. Indeed, students’ justification schemes can
take various forms, and these have been classified by Harel and Sowder (1998, 2007)
under the following three general categories: (1) externally based, when conviction
originates from some source that is external to the student, such as an authority
(authoritarian justification scheme), the form of an argument (ritual justification
scheme), or the treatment of symbols that does not have a particular meaning (non-
referential symbolic justification scheme); (2) empirical, when conviction is based
exclusively on the use of one or more examples (examples-based or inductive
justification scheme) or on perception of one or more drawings (perceptual justification
scheme); and (3) deductive or analytic, when conviction is based on reasoning that is
concerned with the general aspects of a mathematical situation (transformational
justification scheme) or on logical deduction of new results from results that are already
accepted (axiomatic justification scheme).
Harel and Sowder’s notion of justification schemes and respective classification
framework (or modified versions thereof) have been used extensively in research
studies in the area of proof. We will not discuss here other relevant classification
frameworks and their relationship to Harel and Sowder’s (this has been done elsewhere;
see, for example Harel & Sowder, 2007, pp. 810–811; Stylianides et al., 2017, pp. 244–
245). What is relevant to our purposes in this paper is that a rather large body of
research has investigated students’ justification schemes and has tended to use one or
both of two kinds of tasks to elicit and document students’ justification schemes (see,
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e.g. Housman & Porter, 2003; Kanellos, Nardi, & Biza, 2018; Lee, 2016): (1) proof
construction tasks, i.e. tasks that ask students to formulate a proof for the truth or falsity
of a mathematical claim (usually a mathematical generalization); and (2) proof evalu-
ation tasks, i.e. tasks that ask students to indicate whether they think given arguments
for a mathematical claim (usually researcher-generated arguments of various mathe-
matical qualities) meet the standard of proof. The operational hypothesis has been that a
student’s purported proof (in the first kind of task) or a student’s evaluation of a given
argument as meeting the standard of proof (in the second kind of task) both reflect, or
indicate, the student’s justification scheme.
Harel and Sowder (2007) reviewed a large number of studies of proof performance
at the school and university levels, and they interpreted the findings of these studies in
terms of the apparent justification schemes that could be inferred from the results. They
concluded that the findings provided evidence that a pervasive justification scheme
among both school and university students is the empirical justification scheme. The
pervasiveness of the empirical justification scheme has been identified also by the
Education Committee of the European Mathematical Society (2011a) as a “solid
finding”1 of mathematics education research in the area of proof:
[C]onsiderable evidence exists that many students rely on validation by means of
one or several examples to support general statements, that this phenomenon is
persistent in the sense that many students continue to do so even after explicit
instruction about the nature of mathematical proof, and that the phenomenon is
international … (pp. 50–51)
The prominence of the empirical justification scheme among students that is de-
scribed in this excerpt is essentially equivalent to many students having the miscon-
ception that empirical arguments2 are proofs, which, as we argued elsewhere
(Stylianides & Stylianides, 2009b), is a major stumbling block to students’ appreciation
of the need to learn about the conventional meaning of proof as a deductive argument.
In our subsequent discussion, we will draw on the strand of mathematics education
research that aimed to document students’ justification schemes, with particular atten-
tion to whether students have the empirical justification scheme. For the purposes of
our exemplification, we will focus on studies that examined students’ justification
schemes in the context of proof construction tasks, though a similar discussion could
be conducted using studies that used proof evaluation tasks. We also clarify that,
although we use the notion of justification schemes as an organizing structure for our
1 The Education Committee of the European Mathematical Society (2011b, p. 46) defined “solid findings” as
follows:
– result from trustworthy, disciplined inquiry, thus being sound and convincing in shedding light
on the question(s) they set out to answer.
– are generally recogised as important contributions that have significantly influenced and/or may
significantly influence the research field.
– can be applied to circumstances and/or domains beyond those involved in this particular
research.
– can be summarised in a brief and comprehensible way to an interested but critical audience of
non-specialists (especially mathematicians and mathematics teachers).
2 The term empirical argument is generally used to describe an invalid (non-proof) argument that purports to
show the truth of a statement based on verification of a proper subset of all the cases covered by the statement.
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discussion, not all studies we discuss herein used this notion to frame their reported
research. We judge, however, that these studies’ findings (or at least the parts we are
interested in) can appropriately be described in these terms and in relation to research-
able questions that might differ from the studies’ stated research questions.
From One Researchable Question to a New One
Some studies into students’ justification schemes in the context of proof construction
tasks (e.g. Healy & Hoyles, 2000; Knuth, Choppin, & Bieda, 2009; Senk, 1989),
especially studies in the early stages of this research strand, addressed among others the
following research question: What are students’ justification schemes as derived from
students’ performance on proof construction tasks? For easy reference, we call this
question RQ1.
Essentially, the aforementioned studies asked students to prove given statements and
then used the arguments produced by the students to draw conclusions about students’
understanding of proof by mapping students’ arguments onto Harel and Sowder’s
framework of justification schemes. So, for example, a student who offered an empir-
ical argument in response to a task that asked the student to prove a mathematical
generalization would be considered to exhibit the empirical justification scheme. If, on
the other hand, a student produced a general mathematical argument, the student would
be considered to exhibit a deductive justification scheme. The findings of these and
other relevant studies painted a bleak picture of students’ justification schemes, and it is
partly on these findings that Harel and Sowder (2007) based their conclusion about the
prominence of the empirical justification scheme among school and university students.
In our own research, as part of a 4-year design experiment in an undergraduate
mathematics course for students who aspired to join a masters-level elementary teacher
education program, we aimed among other goals to help students overcome the
misconception that empirical arguments are proofs and thus help them progress beyond
the empirical justification scheme (see, e.g. Stylianides & Stylianides, 2009b). How-
ever, we were surprised to observe in the early research cycles of our design experiment
that a considerable number of students would persist in producing empirical arguments
in response to proof construction tasks, even after we had evidence to believe that the
students had understood the limitations of empirical arguments and their inadequacy to
meet the standard of proof. This made us begin to uncover a potentially influential
factor that both prior research and ourselves seemed to have overlooked up to that point
in time when addressing RQ1, namely, students’ own perceptions of whether their
produced arguments actually met the standard of proof. In particular, some students
could be providing empirical arguments to proof construction tasks not because they
believed that empirical arguments were proofs but because, for example, they could not
come up with better arguments. In other words, instead of leaving a blank response to
the question posed by the instructor, the students might have chosen to write down an
erroneous response (in this case, an empirical argument) while still being fully aware of
the limitations of their response (in this case, the fact that an empirical argument does
not meet the standard of proof).
Our emerging appreciation of the aforementioned factor helped us realize also that
our original research design was insufficient to accurately detect the possible existence
of the empirical justification scheme among our students. Indeed, the design was based,
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implicitly and unwarily, on an assumption that might have not been true for all students,
namely, that the arguments the students produced in response to proof construction
tasks were actually what the students believed constituted a proof. Accordingly, the
findings we had obtained from that research design were likely inaccurate: our failure to
account for the new factor might have resulted in us reporting an inflated number of
students having the empirical justification scheme. Relatedly, the research question we
had used in the original design (namely, RQ1) was no longer fit for purpose as it failed
to guide an investigation that would distinguish students who produced empirical
arguments and considered those arguments as proofs (i.e. students who exhibited the
empirical justification scheme) from other students who produced again empirical
arguments but were fully aware of the limitations of their arguments (i.e. students
who did not exhibit the empirical justification scheme).
To account for the new factor, we modified our research design by adding a follow-
up prompt to the original prompt that asked students to prove a statement. Specifically,
the follow-up prompt asked students to evaluate their argument constructions in
response to the first prompt: “Do you believe you have actually produced a proof?
Why or why not?” In the new research design, conclusions about participants’ justifi-
cations schemes were drawn based on the combined consideration of their responses to
the two prompts. So, for example, a student who provided an empirical argument to the
first prompt (the proof construction prompt) would not be considered exhibiting the
empirical justification scheme unless the student also indicated in the second prompt
(the evaluation prompt) that he or she actually considered the argument to be a proof.
The modification in the research design to include a “proof evaluation component” in
addition to the “proof construction component” also necessitated modification of our
research question. The new researchable question we posed was the following: What
are students’ justification schemes as derived from students’ performance on combined
proof construction-evaluation tasks? (RQ2).
With this research design and research question, we conducted a new investigation
into students’ justification schemes using combined proof construction-evaluation tasks
(Stylianides & Stylianides, 2009a). We found that the students who produced empirical
arguments were roughly split evenly between those who were aware that their argu-
ments did not qualify as proofs and those who believed that their arguments qualified as
proofs. The same pattern was observed more generally among the students who
produced non-proof arguments (of which empirical arguments is a sub-class). These
findings offered evidence that students’ own perceptions (evaluations) of whether their
produced arguments in proof construction tasks actually met the standard of proof is an
important factor for researchers to consider in investigations of students’ justification
schemes. The findings also helped deepen the theoretical understanding of students’
justification schemes by illuminating aspects of students’ proof-related behavior in
proof construction tasks that tended to go undetected when students were asked to only
prove given statements.
In order to offer a possible account of the phenomenon of some students providing
invalid arguments to proving tasks while being aware of the limitations of their
responses, we used Brousseau’s (1997) notion of didactical contract, which refers to
the system of reciprocal obligations between teachers and their students that are specific
to the target knowledge. According to this system of reciprocal obligations, which may
be implicit and informal, blank responses to a task that is posed by the teacher (not
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necessarily a proving task) are not appropriate as they could be failing to meet the
teacher’s expectation to receive from the students a response (not necessarily a correct
one), and so students tend to offer the best response they can come up with even when
they are aware that their response is flawed. This account helps explain also other
findings from the literature, such as those reported by Knuth et al. (2009) that students
were more likely to produce empirical arguments for more difficult proving tasks (the
researchers reported 81% vs. 36% empirical arguments for two tasks of different levels
of difficulty). According to the researchers, “students likely had no recourse but to use
examples as their means of justification” (p. 161).
The Expansion of New Researchable Questions
In this part, we will discuss briefly three recent studies that are relevant to the
investigation of students’ justification schemes (Dawkins & Karunakaran, 2016;
Stylianides, 2019; Weber, Lew, & Mejia-Ramos, 2020), and we will consider how
each of them can take RQ2 to a new direction, thus giving rise to new researchable
questions. We will label the new research questions as RQ3a–c so as to indicate their
conceptual (rather than actual) evolution from RQ2. We will also use RQ3a–c as a
context in which to reflect on implications of the expansion of research knowledge in
the area of students’ justification schemes as well as the consequential expansion of
new researchable questions in this area.
Dawkins and Karunakaran (2016) drew attention to the role ofmathematical content
(e.g. algebra, geometry, analysis), including students’ mathematical meanings for
mathematical content, as a potentially influential factor of students’ proof-related
behavior. This is relevant to our discussion here as we view students’ justification
schemes as an indicator of students’ proof-related behavior. Dawkins and Karunakaran
argued and illustrated the possible negative consequences of a content-generic ap-
proach to mathematics education research on students’ proof-related behavior. The
authors clarified that they did “not intend to deny the validity or value of prior research
framed in a content-independent manner […] but rather seek to sensitize the commu-
nity to possible blind spots induced by common lenses applied to research data and to
endorse a research agenda focused on the interplay between proving and particular
mathematical content” (p. 65). Dawkins and Karunakaran’s message implies a need for
the role of mathematical content to be considered in examinations of students’ justifi-
cation schemes, including in the statement of research questions. This message leads,
then, to an extension of RQ2 to the following new set of researchable questions: In the
particular content area of algebra/geometry/analysis/[…], what are students’ justifica-
tion schemes as derived from students’ performance on combined proof construction-
evaluation tasks? (RQ3a). Comparisons of students’ proof constructions and evalua-
tions of their constructions in different content areas can offer useful insights into the
extent to which students’ justification schemes are content-specific or content-generic.
Moving on to the second study we will consider in this part, Stylianides (2019) drew
attention to another factor that received limited attention by research on students’
proof-related behavior, namely, the mode of representation (written versus oral) used
by students as they communicate their proof constructions. In a way similar to Dawkins
and Karunakaran (2016) but with a focus on the role of argument representation,
Stylianides (2019) argued and illustrated the possible negative consequences of a
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representation-generic examination of students’ proof constructions. Specifically, in the
context of actual classroom practice, Stylianides compared the written arguments that
secondary students produced and perceived to be proofs with the oral arguments that
the same students presented in front of the class for the same claims, and he found that
the oral arguments were more likely than the written arguments to meet the standard of
proof. In discussing the implications of these findings, Stylianides noted the following:
[P]rior research on secondary students’ argument constructions tended to use
survey methods and only consider students presenting their perceived proofs in
written form. Based on students’ written arguments, this research has painted a
bleak picture of secondary students’ ability to construct arguments that meet the
standard of proof. The findings reported in this article suggest that the limited use
of observational methods and the lack of consideration of students presenting
their perceived proofs orally—in tandem with students’ written proofs for the
same claims—is a serious threat to the validity of research findings in this area.
Indeed, if a study had analysed students’ written arguments only (as in survey
research), it would have reported a less favourable picture of the potential of
students’ constructed proofs than another study that would focus only on stu-
dents’ oral arguments (as in observational research). Also, by considering only
one mode of representation and ignoring the other, each study individually would
have reported an incomplete picture of students’ constructed proofs, for appar-
ently it matters whether students present their perceived proofs orally or in
writing. (p. 177)
Stylianides’ findings support another extension of RQ2 as follows: What are students’
justification schemes as derived from students’ performance on combined proof
construction-evaluation tasks whereby students’ perceived proofs are communicated
in written/oral/combined written-and-oral form? (RQ3b).
Weber et al. (2020) further expanded work in this area by proposing a new
framework for investigating and explaining students’ proof-related behavior. The
framework introduces additional factors that potentially influence students’ proof
constructions and the inferences that researchers might draw from them about students’
justification schemes. Specifically, Weber et al. adapted constructs from “expectancy
value theory” (e.g. Eccles &Wigfield, 2002) to investigate and illustrate empirically the
following claim: whether a student will seek a proof or settle for a non-proof argument
(including an empirical argument) depends partly on the value the student places on
knowing the veracity of a mathematical statement, the cost in terms of time and effort
that is required for the search for a proof, and the student’s perceived likelihood of
success of being able to find a proof. Consider, for example, a student who offered an
empirical argument in response to a proof construction task. This student might believe
that the empirical argument bestowed certainty in the truth of the generalization and
thus consider the argument to be a proof, in which case the student can be said to
exhibit the empirical justification scheme. However, Weber et al. argued that there are
at least three other possibilities for which the student might have offered the empirical
argument: (1) the student might not be interested in being certain about the truth of the
generalization and thus settle for the first argument (empirical) that he or she produced
(an issue of value); (2) the student might consider searching for a proof to be an
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unpleasant endeavor and thus settle for an empirical argument that presumably requires
less effort to produce than a proof (an issue of cost); or (3) the student might settle for
the empirical argument because he or she believes the construction of a proof is beyond
his or her capability (an issue of likelihood of success). These alternative possibilities of
the student’s proof-related behavior challenge the certainty of the conclusion that a
student’s empirical argument is evidence of the student exhibiting the empirical
justification scheme and thus point to the need for research into students’ justification
schemes to consider the three factors in the expectancy value model. In other words,
this model supports another extension of RQ2 as follows: What are students’ justifica-
tion schemes as derived from students’ performance on combined proof construction-
evaluation tasks and based on students’ considerations of value, cost, and likelihood of
success in their produced arguments? (RQ3c).
The three studies in the area of students’ justification schemes that we discussed in
this part of the paper (Dawkins &Karunakaran, 2016; Stylianides, 2019;Weber et al.,
2020) illustrate the idea that the conceptual terrain in this research area becomes more
complex with advancements in research knowledge about the factors that can influ-
ence students’ performance on proof construction tasks. Also, as the field’s knowl-
edge of new potentially influential factors grows, there is a consequential expansion
of new researchable questions that can guide researchers’ investigations towards a
more refined, and presumably more accurate, body of research knowledge about
students’ justification schemes. For example, findings of investigations of new
researchable questions RQ3a and RQ3b can contribute, respectively, to the develop-
ment of content-specific (Dawkins & Karunakaran, 2016) and representation-
specific (Stylianides, 2019) portraits of students’ justification schemes, which in
turn might help point out important trends that went undetected by prior research. At
the same time, however, the field’s research knowledge about students’ justification
schemes can become more fragmented: As research reports of content- and
representation-generic findings give place to reports of content- and representation-
specific findings, it is less justifiable for researchers to cluster together or even
compare findings across studies that did not account for these factors. Although this
may be an unwelcome development from a policy standpoint where generalized
descriptions of phenomena can help guide policy decisions about instructional
practice, things can be different from a research standpoint. Dawkins and
Karunakaran (2016) hypothesized that “our field’s implicit invitation to overgener-
alize empirical findings are partly to blame for the confusing and seemingly contra-
dictory claims available in the literature on proof” (p. 73).
The field’s growing knowledge of additional potentially influential factors renders
the methodological landscape complex too. Clearly, it will be methodologically chal-
lenging to design a new research study to document students’ justification schemes in
the context of proof construction tasks that will account for the whole range of factors
reflected in RQ3a–c: the mathematical content where the tasks are embedded (RQ3a,
Dawkins & Karunakaran, 2016), the mode of representation with which students’
arguments are communicated (RQ3b, Stylianides, 2019), and students’ considerations
of value, cost, and likelihood of success in constructing their arguments (RQ3c, Weber
et al., 2020). One can appreciate further the challenges of designing such a study by
being mindful of the fact that the potentially influential factors worth considering might
not be limited to those that we discussed herein for the purposes of exemplification.
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We clarify that we are not suggesting that all new research studies aiming to
investigate students’ justification schemes should account for all of the potentially
influential factors discussed herein or others. We share Dawkins and Karunakaran’s
(2016) view that “students’ mathematical reasoning is an incredibly multi-faceted and
complex forum for investigation” and that “[n]o single study can account for all of the
dimensions of variation at play” (p. 73). As we pointed out in the opening paragraph of
this paper, when posing a new researchable question, a researcher needs to make
decisions about how to deal with the whole web of factors that can possibly influence
the phenomenon under examination in a careful, transparent, and justifiable way,
drawing on relevant theoretical or conceptual frameworks and associated empirical
findings. But how can researchers deal, in practical terms, with the fundamental
challenge of curtailing and managing the proliferation of factors that can influence
the phenomenon under examination? We will consider this question in the next section
as it is broad and does not relate specifically to the notion of justification schemes.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we argued that posing new researchable questions in educational research is a
dynamic process that reflects the field’s growing understanding of the web of potentially
influential factors surrounding the examination of a particular phenomenon of interest. We
illustrated this thesis by drawing on a strand of mathematics education research related to
students’ justification schemes (Harel & Sowder, 1998, 2007) that has evolved rapidly
during the past few decades (see, e.g. Harel & Sowder, 2007; Stylianides et al., 2016, 2017)
and thus offered a good context for exemplification of the thesis. In what follows we will
first reflect on the boundaries of the domain of application of our thesis, and then we will
consider three main implications of the thesis.
Boundaries of the Domain of Application of the Thesis
We cannot accurately determine the boundaries of the domain of application of the
thesis, because we lack a thorough knowledge of the evolution of researchable ques-
tions across strands of educational research. However, our (limited) knowledge of
several other research strands within mathematics education gives us confidence that
the domain of application of the thesis is broad and goes beyond that of justification
schemes. Next, we will briefly consider two other examples to illustrate this point.
The first example relates to the following research question: “What is the potential of
mathematical problems, with or without a connection to reality, to trigger students’
task-specific interest in problem solving?” In describing this example, we draw pri-
marily on work by Schukajlow and colleagues (Rellensmann & Schukajlow, 2017;
Schukajlow, Leiss, Pekrun, Blum, Müller, & Messner, 2012) who distinguished be-
tween two broad categories of problems: those with a connection to reality, called “real-
world problems,” and those without such a connection to reality, called “intra-mathe-
matical problems.” Although there are sub-categories within each of these categories of
problems, real-world problems are often used in curriculum materials for the purpose of
triggering student interest (Meyer, Dekker, & Querelle, 2001). However, there is a lack
of robust empirical evidence linking any of these problem categories to a higher level of
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student interest. For example, Schukajlow et al. (2012) found no difference in students’
interest in real-world and intra-mathematical problems. In a follow-up study,
Rellensmann and Schukajlow (2017) investigated the above research question by
controlling for task difficulty, which was a factor that prior research including
Schukajlow et al. (2012) had tended to overlook. Controlling for task difficulty resulted
in the reversal of Rellensmann and Schukajlow’s (2017) original expectations, for they
found that “intra-mathematical problems [rather than real-world problems] are better
suited for capturing students’ interest” (p. 375). According to the authors, “[t]hese
findings underpin the idea that task difficulty is a factor that should be taken into
account in research on task-specific interest (Renninger, 1998) because the difference in
students’ interest in solving problems with and without a connection to reality is hidden
if the confounding effect of task difficulty is not controlled for” (p. 375).
The second example relates to the following research question that was posed in the
1970s: “What is the effect of teachers’ mathematics coursework on students’ mathe-
matics achievement?” Begle’s (1979) meta-analysis of studies conducted between 1960
and 1976 (cited in Ball, Lubienski, & Mewborn, 2001) showed that teachers’ mathe-
matics coursework produced positive main effects on students’ achievement in only
10% of the cases and, more surprisingly, negative main effects in 8%. These studies
used teachers’ coursework in mathematics as a proxy for teachers’mathematics content
knowledge. Given that teachers’ mathematics content knowledge was deeply thought
to make a difference in students’ achievement, the aforementioned findings (especially
the negative effects) puzzled researchers over the role of teachers’ content knowledge
in teaching. Subsequent theoretical advances in the field elaborated the notion of
teachers’ content knowledge and its various sub-components (e.g. Ball, Thames, &
Phelps, 2008; Rowland, Turner, Thwaites, & Huckstep, 2009; Shulman, 1986), making
clear that teachers’ coursework is a poor proxy for the multi-faceted notion of teachers’
content knowledge, which includes also components such as teachers’ understanding of
students’ thinking and ways of representing the subject matter. These theoretical
advances gave rise to new notions that are used to describe teachers’ knowledge, like
teachers’ mathematical knowledge for teaching (Ball et al., 2001, 2008), and they led
to the posing of new researchable questions such as the following: “What is the effect
of teachers’ mathematical knowledge for teaching on students’ mathematics achieve-
ment?” (Hill, Rowan, & Ball, 2005). Hill et al. (2005) found that teachers’ mathemat-
ical knowledge for teaching has a positive effect on students’ mathematics achieve-
ment, a finding that marks a major advancement in research knowledge since Begle’s
(1979) time. This is not to criticize Begle who posed a research question that made
sense at the time, but to illustrate the point that an increased understanding of the web
of potentially influential factors led to new researchable questions.
Implications of the Thesis
Besides serving the purpose of deepening theoretical understanding about how new
researchable questions are, or can be, generated in educational research, our discussion
also identified and illustrated three important implications of our thesis. Next, we will
summarize and elaborate as appropriate on these inter-related implications.
The first implication is that, as new potentially influential factors are identified,
findings from past research that had not accounted for those factors might prove to be
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insufficient or be challenged. This implication is illustrated by all three examples we
discussed in this paper. Clearly, this is not a criticism of past research as the findings of
those studies are judged retrospectively, but the identification of new potentially
influential factors does nevertheless complexify the conceptual landscape surrounding
the phenomenon of interest.
The second implication concerns the methodological challenges that arise for
researchers as they navigate this complex conceptual landscape and seek to design
new studies that pay due regard to research advances about all relevant and potentially
influential factors. Of course it is still possible for new studies to focus on specific
factors pertaining to the phenomenon of interest, say the justification schemes exhibited
by students as they engage with proving tasks involving visual or non-visual reasoning
(cf. Alcock & Simpson, 2004, 2005; Hadas, Hershkowitz, & Schwarz, 2000), while
accounting for or considering in a meaningful way other known relevant factors, such
as by limiting the research scope (and conclusions) in a particular content area (e.g.
geometry). The broader question that arises at this point, though, is the one that we
posed earlier in the paper and relates to the dialectical nature of the web of factors
known to influence a phenomenon and investigations of that phenomenon: How can
researchers deal, in practical terms, with the fundamental challenge of curtailing and
managing the proliferation of factors that can influence the phenomenon under exam-
ination? This is a particularly hard question to address and possibly deserves a paper of
its own. We raise it here explicitly to offer some initial thoughts about it, drawing
primarily on Clement’s (2000) discussion of “explanatory models,” and to invite other
researchers to unpack it and elaborate on possible ways to address it.3 As we will
explain, Clement’s discussion of explanatory models can be used to offer researchers
theoretically principled ways to justify their focus on particular factors while ignoring
others.
According to Clement (2000), explanatory models “are not merely condensed
summaries of empirical observations but, rather, are inventions that contribute new
mechanisms and concepts that are part of the scientist’s view of the world and that are
not ‘given’ in the data” (p. 549). In other words, Clement views such models as
providing an explanatory description why the phenomenon of interest occurred and
give satisfying explanations for “patterns of observable behavior.” Using again the
notion of students’ justification schemes as an example and applying Clement’s
terminology, a student’s empirical justification would be an “observable behavior”
while students’ propensity to offer empirical justifications would be a “pattern of
observable behavior.” The factors that we discussed in the previous section of the
paper related to the mathematical content where the proving tasks are embedded (cf.
Dawkins & Karunakaran, 2016), the mode of representation with which students’
arguments are communicated (cf. Stylianides, 2019), and students’ considerations of
value, cost, and likelihood of success in constructing their arguments (cf. Weber et al.,
2020) are all examples of factors that may well be part of an explanatory model of the
aforementioned pattern of observable behavior. Yet developing an explanatory model is
challenging, especially when it pertains to higher order thinking skills such as students’
justification schemes that are complex and prone to the influence of a multitude of
factors. Another challenge in designing an explanatory model is finding an appropriate
3 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer who brought Clement’s (2000) work to our attention.
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grain size for it. As Clement points out, there are many virtues of an explanatory model
that go beyond accuracy and that there are trade-offs as one cannot simply act to
maximize all the characteristics of a good model. Parsimonious models are often
superior to complicated models that are slightly more accurate.
Accordingly, a good parsimonious model can offer a way to address the question we
raised above about the dialectical nature of the web of factors known to influence a
phenomenon and investigations of that phenomenon, by allowing researchers, in a
theoretically principled way, to cleave out the list of factors they want to consider in
their study while ignoring others. Until such a model is developed, though, it is
important that reports of research include a detailed description of the context of the
studies as well as the factors that were considered in the studies and other known
factors that might have influenced the phenomenon but were not considered. This
detailed description of the context is particularly important because, if new factors that
influence the phenomenon of interest are discovered in the future, researchers can be in
a position to determine whether those factors had any bearing on the findings of past
studies and the extent to which the findings of those studies are still useful for
comparative purposes or applicable in specific contexts.
The third implication of our thesis in this paper builds on the previous two and
concerns the evolving nature of research knowledge as findings from studies on new
researchable questions become available. For example, early research on students’
justification schemes could defensibly draw general conclusions like “many students
exhibit the empirical justification scheme.” However, the more we (as a field) learn
about potentially influential factors, the more we view such general conclusions with
caution. In particular, the aforementioned conclusion would now have to be qualified in
terms of the mathematical content where students exhibited certain schemes (cf.
Dawkins & Karunakaran, 2016) or in terms of the mode of representation that students
used to communicate their arguments (cf. Stylianides, 2019). Thus, as a wider range of
potentially influential factors get discovered and considered, research knowledge
becomes not only more refined and presumably more accurate, but possibly more
fragmented too. On this basis, one may be confronted with this paradox: As we (as a
field) deepen our understanding of the complex network of factors that have a bearing
on the phenomenon of interest, the further away we get from being in a position to draw
defensible general conclusions about the phenomenon. This paradox, which may not be
specific to students’ justification schemes or the other two examples we discussed in
this paper, has policy ramifications, especially with regard to assessment. For example,
assessing students’ justification schemes cannot be a matter of evaluating students’
performance on proving tasks from a single content area (popularly geometry) or in
written form only.
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